Betrand Russell – Problems of Philosophy

As valet we naturally believe that the sunninessniness go forth face lift tomor course of instruction. But why is it that we believe this? In the following essay I will explore the logic behind this question focusing on Bertrand Russells arguments of induction, and the uniformity of nature as presented in his book The Problems of ism Russells principle of the uniformity of nature suggests humans and animals fall into the jam of believing that everything that has and will happen becomes a general law with no exceptions (Russell, 63). In other words, the more than frequently something hands, the more certain it is to occur again.Russell provides an example citing the blood between a yellow(a) and a farmer. When the chicken sees the farmer coming everyday, he assumes, as per usual, that he will be fed, but ultimately one day the farmer will run with the chicken (Russell, 63). This is the trap that we frequently fall into by becoming similarly accustomed to what has already occurred, and assuming that it will always happen again. Russell argues that this is because humans use inducive logic to generate these general laws, which are employ as the basis for the uniformity of nature (Russell, 66).This principle of induction states that the more times we see two things to be associated, the greater the certainty that this stand is accurate (Russell, 67). An example is the rising of the sun. Through inductive logic we discombobulate determined that every morning, the sun will inherently rise (Russell, 64). in that location is however, a small chance that the worlds rotational overstretch could stop which would result in the sun not rising. However, as inductive logic brings us to certainty without bourn, it is seemingly impossible that the sun wouldnt rise, based on the billions of times it has risen in the retiring(a) (Russell, 69).This is where I believe at that place is an issue in Russells argument. I believe that there is no legitimate evidenc e supporting the relationship between induction and the uniformity of nature. In my opinion regardless of how legion(predicate) times the sun comes up the chance of the sun rising the attached day, does not change. From this I conclude that induction is not a congruous way of determining whether or not the sun will rise, because there is still an unchanging probability that it will not.Russell counters this by arguing that through induction we can approach a level of almost certainty, without limit (Russell, 67). I believe this to be a fallacy as advantageously because this statement in itself is an oxymoron. It suggests that there are different degrees of certainty, which is contrary to the comment of certainty itself. While I do believe that the sun will rise tomorrow, my belief is routed in the uniformity of nature, not in induction, as I am not convinced of this certainty which induction requires.Russell would in one case again refute this suggesting that its not the level of certainty, but kinda the probability of the sun rising that increases. I however, believe that this probability cannot change. for each one sunrise is independent of one another, just as each head of a coin is. Regardless of how many heads in a row I get, I cannot by any logical measure guess that the coin will always flip heads. Similarly, I cannot conclude that the sun will always rise just because it has in the past. Based on these grounds, the argument of induction does not stand, and hence, is not related to the uniformity of nature.